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EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION FOLLOWING
INDICTMENT IS ADMISSIBLE
People v. Spano,
4 N.Y.2d 256, 150 N.E.2d 226 (1958)
In February 1957 Vincent Spano, accompanied by counsel, sur-
rendered to an assistant district attorney of Bronx County, New York.
He surrendered at 7:15 p.m. pursuant to a bench warrant issued fol-
lowing his indictment for first degree murder. Spano's counsel then
left after warning him only to divulge his name. The accused was
taken to the office of the assistant district attorney and questioned.
Shortly after midnight he was taken to police headquarters for booking
and fingerprinting. At about 3:30 a.m. he made a full confession after
having spoken with a patrolman friend for approximately an hour. He
was arraigned before a county court judge promptly that morning.
During his trial this confession was admitted into evidence against Spano,
and he was convicted. He appealed upon grounds that the confession,
though voluntarily made, was inadmissible as evidence since it was ob-
tained by police officers after indictment and surrender, and without the
presence of counsel. The conviction was upheld by the New York Court
of Appeals in a four to three decision.'
The court here was not confronted with the federal McNabb
rule2 which excludes confessions obtained during illegal detention,3 since
that rule applies only to the federal courts. Nor was the court con-
cerned with the requirement of the fourteenth amendment that a con-
fession to be admissible must be obtained without physical or psychologi-
cal coercion,4 since no such coercion was alleged in this case. The issue
1 People v. Spano, 4 N.Y.2d 256, 150 N.E.2d 226 (1958).
2 A confession made before confinement where the accused is not promptly
taken before a committing officer after arrest is inadmissible. McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
3 The McNabb rule has been further defined in recent cases: Mallory v.
United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) (It is unlawful detention to hold a prisoner
from afternoon until the next morning without commitment when a magistrate
is readily available.); United States v. Carignan, note 10 infra; Upshaw v.
United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948) (A confession obtained during unlawful
detention is inadmissible even though entirely voluntary.). But see United States v.
Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944) (A confession made prior to the time the detention
becomes unlawful is admissible.). For a discussion of these cases see Hennings,
Detention and Confessions: The Mallory Case, 23 Mo. L. REV. 25 (1958).
4,,. . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See Rochin
v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (pumping stomach for evidence); Watts v.
Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949) (prolonged incommunicado questioning); Haley v.
Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (psychological coercion); Malinski v. New York,
324 U.S. 401 (1945) (held incommunicado, part of the time naked); Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (physical brutality).
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was raised that the confession was obtained during unlawful detention.
The court disposed of this point by showing that unlawful detention
alone does not make a confession inadmissible in New York,5 and by
establishing that the detention in this instance actually was not unlawful.
What then was there about this case which caused three judges of the
New York Court of Appeals to believe that the confession was im-
properly admitted?
There is one feature which distinguishes this case from earlier
New York confession cases. This confession was obtained through police
interrogation after indictment and after surrender to the court on a
bench warrant, not while the accused was merely a suspect as in the
previous cases. As Judge Desmond stated in the dissenting opinion:
"Now we accept as evidence a confession extracted during the very
course of judicial proceedings .. -6 The dissenting justices sensed the
presence of what we might term a constructive involuntariness.' The
bench warrant provided that Spano be brought before the court to
answer the indictment, and it was for that purpose that he was in police
custody. In light of the existence of the indictment and 'bench warrant
the minority is technically correct in saying that the confession was
extracted after the commencement of judicial proceedings. 8 The issue
becomes whether a prisoner so detained is deprived of due process when
he is interrogated without counsel concerning the crime of which he
stands accused.
Spano was a defendant and not a suspect. The state had already
acquired sufficient evidence for indictment, and the need for further
interrogation was questionable. The bench warrant required the de-
fendant to be brought before the court to answer the indictment. The
dissenting view is that such a deviation from these instructions violates
the prisoner's constitutional rights. One can sense an element of un-
fairness in such procedure. The majority opinion carried to its logical
5The test of a confession is its voluntariness. See People v. Alex, 265 N.Y.
192, 192 N.E. 289 (1934); People v. Mummiani, 258 N.Y. 394, 180 N.E. 94 (1932);
People v. Doran, 246 N.Y. 409, 159 N.E. 379 (1927) ; People v. Trybus, 219 N.Y.
IS, 113 N.E. 538 (1916); Balbo v. People, 80 N.Y. 484 (1880).
6 People v. Spano, supra note 1, 150 N.E.2d at 231.
7Applying the due process standard, the United States Supreme Court has
reversed a conviction based upon a confession gleaned after thirty-six hours of
relentless police questioning. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Black said:
"We think a situation such as that here shown . . . is so inherently coercive that
its very existence is irreconcilable with the possession of mental freedom by a
lone suspect against whom its full coercive force is brought to bear." (footnote
omitted). Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944). Although the instant
confession was not obtained under the same conditions, the dissent certainly feels
that it was taken under "inherently coercive" circumstances.
8A judicial proceeding has been broadly defined as: "A general term for
proceedings relating to, practiced in, or proceeding from, a court of justice; or
the course prescribed to be taken in various cases for the determination of a
controversy or for legal redress or relief." BLACK, LAw DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
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end would permit midnight interrogation by police and prosecuting at-
torneys even while the trial is in progress, thus seeming to infringe upon
the domain of the court. Undoubtedly these judges share the opinion of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter that:
Ours is the accusatorial as opposed to the inquisitorial system.
: . . Under our system society carries the burden of proving
its charge against the accused not out of his own mouth. It
must establish its case, not by interrogation of the accused
even under judicial safeguards, but by evidence independently
secured through skillful investigation.
9
The facts of the instant case make it an oddity. Midnight inter-
rogation once a prisoner has been indicted is rare. Even under the strict
federal rules of evidence, however, a prisoner arraigned and confined
pending trial on one charge may be questioned concerning another crime
of which he is suspected but for which he has not been arraigned. While
awaiting trial upon a charge of assault to rape, the defendant in
United States v. Carignan° was taken unaccompanied by counsel to a
United States marshal's office where he was questioned concerning a
murder. He confessed to the murder, and the confession was later ad-
mitted into evidence against him. There, although Carignan was ques-
tioned after arraignment concerning an entirely different crime than
the one for which he had been incarcerated, the interrogation did take
place during the course of judicial proceedings.
There is much emphasis in the dissenting opinion upon the fact
that Spano's attorney was not with him when he confessed. This is
deemed to be deprivation of due process. Granted that the accused has
the right to the aid of counsel in every stage of judicial proceedings in
New York," it is difficult to see in this case how Spano was deprived of
this right. His attorney was with him at his surrender and subsequently
advised him only to divulge his name. Spano followed this advice until
after a conference with his patrolman friend. In regard to a confession
made to police prior to arraignment or indictment the New Jersey Su-
preme Court has held that:
In answer to the argument that the defendants were not
advised of their rights and privileges the law over the years
in this State has been that a person is only entitled to counsel
o Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949). See note 4, supra.
10 342 U.S. 36 (1951).
11 "[W]hen the defendant is brought before the magistrate, the magistrate
must immediately inform him of the charge against him and of his right to the
aid of counsel in every stage of the proceedings. . . ." N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc.
§ 699 (1).
1958]
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to aid him in his defense, not to save him from his own
voluntary acts .... 12
This would seem to be applicable to the Spano case.
Authorities cited in the dissenting opinion are distinguishable from
the instant case upon their facts. People v. McMahon' and People v.
Mondon 4 both involved confessions made by 'itnesses at coroners' in-
quests. These were held to be inadmissible on the theory that an oath
thus administered when the mind was disturbed might prevent voluntary
mental action. In People v. Perez' 5 the court indicates through dicta
that it would not accept a confession obtained by deliberately jailing a
person as a material witness for interrogation when there was sufficient
evidence to hold him as a defendant. Lanza v. New York State Joint
Legislative Comm.'6 concerned the recording of a supposedly private
conversation between an attorney and his client in a county jail.
Ohio takes the view of the majority in the instant case that the
test of admissibility is the voluntariness of the confession.1 7 A voluntary
confession has been upheld where a sixty year old defendant was taken
into custody without a warrant, jailed without arraignment and was
driven nearly two hundred miles at 2:00 a.m. for a lie detector test and
nine hours of questioning.'
8
When determining the admissibility of confessions the courts are
confronted with conflicting interests. They must protect the right of
the accused to a fair trial, and at the same time they must not tie the
hands of law enforcement officers and prosecutors whose duty it is to
obtain evidence to convict criminals. New York has now admitted into
evidence a confession obtained after the commencement of judicial pro-
ceedings. Whether there is a point at which the court will draw a line
and hold that the judicial process is too far advanced to permit such
procedure remains for future determination.
Frank M. Hays
12 State v. Bunk, 4 N.J. 461, 470, 73 A.2d 249, 254 (1950), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 839 (1950). See also State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953) ; State v.
Cole, 136 N.J.L. 606, 56 A.2d 898 (1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 851 (1948); State
v. Murphy, 87 N.J.L. 515, 94 At. 640 (1915).
13 15 N.Y. 384 (1857).
14 103 N.Y. 211, 8 N.E. 496 (1886).
15 300 N.Y. 208, 90 N.E.2d 40 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 952 (1950).
16 3 N.Y.2d 92, 143 N.E.2d 772 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 856 (1957).
17 State v. Yeoman, 112 Ohio St. 214, 147 N.E. 3 (1925); Lefevre v. State,
50 Ohio St. 584, 35 N.E. 52 (1893); Spears v. State, 2 Ohio St. 583 (1853); State
v. Arnold, 44 Ohio L. Abs. 45, 63 N.E.2d 31 (1945); State v. Collett, 44 Ohio L.
Abs. 225, 58 N.E.2d 417 (1944), dismissed for want of a debatable question, 144
Ohio St. 639, 60 N.E.2d 170 (1945) ; State v. Hensley, 31 Ohio L. Abs. 348 (1939).
See 15 OHIO JuR.2d Criminal Law §§ 400-09 (1955).
18 State v. Collett, supra note 17.
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